Introduction
The cost and benefit of a system of audited accounting information is potentially affected by officially established accounting and audit reporting rules and rules governing sufficiency of audit evidence. Various theories have been proposed to explain accounting standards voting and lobbying behavior. For example, it has been suggested that Accounting Principles Board members chose accounting rules based on the preferences of the member's firm's major clients [Wheat (1972) Rockness and Nikolai (1977) ]. Also, it has been argued that corporate managements lobby in support of accounting rules that benefit management [Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Horngren (1973) ]. Similarly. there have been charges that Big 8 auditing firms dominate auditing standards setting [U.S. Congress (Metcalf Report) (1976)] .
In this paper. we explore auditing firm preferences and voting patterns for recent auditing and reporting issues considered by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB). Groups of firms commonly vote together (or express the same preference) on seemingly diverse issues. We propose a positive theory to explain the observed vote pattern. In particular, we hypothesize that firms' votes are a function of their use of a structured auditing technology.
For the three-year period studied, a relative technology measure is associated with preferences for proposed statements and the size of the firm is not. This result is consistent with the proposed technology-based economic theory and inconsistent with the charge that large firms dominate the standard setting process.
The paper is organized as follows. Structured and unstructured approaches to auditing are contrasted in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the nature and role of the ASB and the audit firms' economic self-interest in codifying auditing standards respectively. Section 5 presents the issues discussed by the ASB during the three-year sample period, while section 6 describes the empirical measures used in the study. Results of the analyses are presented in section 7, followed by conclusions in section 8.
Structured vs. unstructured audit approaches
Audit firms have adopted audit technologies along a structured-unstructured continuum [Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) ]. Structured firms tend to (1) require use of statistical sampling, (2) use structured internal control evaluations that culminate in a prescribed audit plan, and (3) use formal scoring sheets or rules for integrating audit test results. Examples of structured firms' techniques include Stringer (1963) (Deloitte Haskins & Sells) on dollar-unit sampling, Stringer (1975) on regression analysis in analytical review, Elliott and Rogers (1972) (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.) on statistical sampling and its relation to internal control scoring rules, and Zuber, Leisenring, Kinney and Elliott (1983) on allocating materiality among accounts to control the risk of undetected material error in financial statements. Examples of firms' operationalization of the structured approach in Statements on Auditing Standards (SASS) are provided by Holstrum and Kirtland (1982) (Deloitte Haskins and Sells), Elliott (1983) , and Touche Ross & Co. (1981) A structured firm is also expected to favor reporting options that specify criteria for opinion modification.
Finally, structured firms are more likely to believe that auditor consensus is desirable. That is, in a given situation different auditors should conduct similar audits and give the same opinion. The Mock and Turner (1981) In this paper we assume that a firm chooses a technology and then expresses a preference for profession-wide auditing standards that are consistent with that technology. We do not have a well developed theory to predict the firm's choice of technology, so to help develop such a theory data are collected on several firm-specific organizational factors that we expect are related to technology choice. Specifically, data are collected on (1) the number of auditors in each firm, (2) audit staffing (ratio of audit staff to audit partners), (3) audit concentration (ratio of audit fees to total fees), and (4) an estimate of the average stock price beta for each firm's client portfolio.
The Auditing Standards Board
The ASB is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant's (AICPA) senior technical body charged with interpreting generally accepted auditing standards.
It is comprised of fifteen AICPA members with no more than five members from Big 8 firms. The Board has always included five members from Big 8 firms, nine members from non-Big 8 firms and one member from academia.
The 
Economic self-interest in audit standard setting
An audit firm can benefit from SASS in several ways. The codification and structuring of audit practice can increase the value of the signal sent by the firm's audit, enable the firm to reduce its staff training costs, reduce its legal costs and reduce the likelihood that more costly government regulation of auditing will be imposed.
AICPA membership implies adherence to that bodies' standards and hence can provide a positive signal on the member firm's audit quality. In that case some firms may choose to free-ride on the signal by joining the AICPA and then not complying with the AICPA's standards. To the extent that SASS make detection and punishment of such free-riding more cost-efficient, they reduce its frequency and increase the value of the signal. Also, since SASS are taught in colleges and universities, staff training costs can be reduced [Hicks (1974) and Mautz (1958) ].
Since SASS are used by the legal system to determine whether an auditor has conducted an adequate audit, SAS codification of audit practice enables the audit firm to adopt audit practices that reduce its legal liability and expected legal costs. To the extent that SASS improve average audit quality. they reduce the number of audit failures. This, in turn reduces the likelihood of costly government intervention in auditing. The above benefits of best audit practice codification via SASS apply to auditors in general. However. the costs of codification are likely to vary across firms. SASS that increase audit structure will be less costly for audit firms that have adopted a structured audit technology similar to that required by the SASS. They will be more costly for audit firms that use an unstructured technology. Those unstructured firms will have to incur costs to implement the technology.
Further, the structured technology is likely to be less efficient for the clients of unstructured firms. Those clients probably chose to be audited by an unstructured audit firm because that alternative was cost efficient. Thus. other things equal. structured firms are expected to support and unstructured firms are expected not to support SASS adding required audit actions.
Thus, audit firms have different economic interests in codification of some auditing standards due to differing incidence of cost. Representing those interests may economically justify a major commitment of personnel time to ASB activities, AICPA task forces and sub-committees.
Hence, the auditing standards environment provides a direct link between standard setting behavior and economic self-interest.
ASB voting and the issues
On all ASB ballots to issue an exposure draft or final pronouncement, a 60-percent majority. or nine votes, is required. Most votes are not close. however. For example, during the 1981-82. 1982-83 and 1983-84 board years twenty ballots on final statements (or separable parts of statements) were taken. All passed and fourteen were passed unanimously.
Of the remaining six. two passed 14-1, two passed 13-2 and one each was passed 12-3 and lo--5 (see table 1 ).
There are several reasons for the strong support of a final SAS. Most issues are not controversial or have little firm-specific interest that can be identified. Also the lengthy 'due process' procedures and board discussions often lead to substantial agreement or a negotiated compromise on the substance or at least the wording of a proposed SAS. As board members become familiar with an issue, some positions are changed and a consensus develops. As a result of board discussions, basic changes in member's positions have been noted. Some board members also report that they have changed their personal position on 1984, p. 462 ) for a similar phenomenon in setting accounting standards]. Finally, once it is clear that a proposed SAS will pass, there is an incentive for a firm not to publicly oppose the statement and risk appearing to be out of step with the profession as a whole. Often, proposed SASS arise from a well publicized audit failure or practice problem [Jaenicke (1977. p. 79)] . To oppose such a regulation or one that has been suggested by a regulatory body such as 1982283 and 1983-84 years, the board had an agenda of 35 basic topics with six yielding three or more members opposed. In the empirical work to follow we focus on these three board years and six issues since principal votes by each board member are recorded.2 Seven issues, each accounting for more than five percent of the total agenda time, collectively consumed 272 hours or 63% of the total hours for the three-year period (see Table 2 ). Two of these are not analyzed. The technology-based theory of section 3 can lead to alternative predictions of support for eliminating the 'subject to' opinion reporting option. Therefore. some background on 'subject to' opinions and their proposed elimination is needed. Auditor reporting on uncertainties as specified in SAS No. 2 allows the auditor to issue an uncertainty qualified 'subject to' opinion, but criteria for when such an option is required or desirable is largely unspecified. Paragraph 24 states: 'When there are material uncertainties, the outcome of which is not susceptible of reasonable estimation, the auditor should consider whether to express an unqualified opinion or to qualify his opinion' (emphasis added). However, there are no criteria for determining whether to qualify for 'reasonably possible' material losses [AICPA (1984) , section 9509.14)].
Criteria based on the auditor's assessment of the probability distribution of possible losses could, of course, be specified. Such criteria are problematic, however, since auditors report on conformity of client financial statements with GAAP and, under Statement on Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (section 4311) management is not required to elaborate with respect to their assessment of the probability distribution on loss contingencies. Furthermore. for loss contingencies involving lawsuits, elaboration by the auditor might result in a self-fulfilling prophesy. Thus, even auditors who prefer structure are 4The Technical Issues Committee Chairwoman had requested such letters from managing partners of members of the Division of Firms of the AICPA. Five unsolicited letters ivere received from such firms in favor of retaining the effective date. All tivc were from members of an association of firma that use dollar-unit sampling not expected to support specific reporting criteria beyond that required of management under GAAP.' One can argue that elimination of the reporting option is a feasible solution to the lack of criteria problem and would be supported by structured firms as a means of reducing variation in reporting. Alternatively, since elimination leads to fewer required audit considerations, one might argue that elimination would be supported by unstructured firms or that since no required actions are added, the theory yields no predictions.
Thus, technology-based predictions are less clear on this issue than the other five.
Empirical measures
Twenty-three practicing auditors from twenty-two different firms served on the board for at least one of the 1981-82, 1982-83 or 1983-84 board years. These firms' positions on the six issues are measured by the actual votes expressed by its member (if the firm is represented at the time of the vote) or by the position taken in firms' public comment letters on exposure drafts issued and positions taken in ASB task force meetings (if the firm is not represented at the time of a ballot). Thus, 107 votes or stated preferences of 22 firms are available for the six controversial issues discussed in section 5. Preferences on all issues are scored on a three-point scale. For the four exposure drafts (issues 2, 3, 4 and 5) a '3' is assigned if the board member (or firm) assented, '1' is assigned if the member dissented, and '2' is assigned for a qualified assent or a neutral position.
Deferral of SAS No. 39 was ballotted twice. A '3' is assigned if a member expressed a preference not to defer (i.e., to make the statement effective as planned), on either (single) ballot or on both ballots if the member expressed a preference both times. A '1' is assigned if either single ballot or both ballots supported deferral, and '2' is assigned if a member supported deferral on the first ballot and did not support deferral on the second.
During the 1981-82 board year, the proposed elimination of 'subject to' opinions was on the agenda for five meetings and a special public meeting. Four preference votes for continuing development of a proposed SAS began with a vote of 9-6 in October 1981 and ended in July 1982 with a 5-9 vote on a proposal to prepare an exposure draft.6 Six members had position changes. A 'Such criteria also seem to go beyond the scope of auditing as defined under GAAS. '3' is assigned to members who consistently favored elimination of 'subject to' opinions, a '1' to those consistently opposed, and a '2' to those who changed position.
To assess a firm's audit practice as to structure, a composite of expert opinion is constructed. Four members of the AICPA's statistical sampling subcommittee were asked first to classify the Big 8 firms into three categories. Following Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) . the basis for classification is the extent to which a firm uses a structured guidance approach in audit sampling, internal control evaluation and integration of audit test results. The subcommittee members were asked to name the two or three most structured firms. the two or three least structured and the two to four in the middle. A '3' was assigned to most structured, '1' for least structured, and '2' for intermediate firms. After classifying the Big 8, the evaluators were asked to evaluate the three 'next seven' firms with representation on the board. In addition, each board member was asked to classify his or her own firm into one of the three groups relative to the Big 8. As indicated below, the model value of the available scores or the equally-weighted mean is used as the measure of firm technology. The two measures are consistent. ' The technology rankings have the following support. First. the interrater Spearman rank correlations are all greater than or equal to 0.80 and significant at the 0.01 level or better. Second, five of the Big 8 knew their firm's technology rankings based on an analysis of audit policy and procedures manuals as determined by Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) . The reported rankings are consistent with the rankings of Cushing and Loebbecke. Finally. two firms have recently publicly discussed the relative merits of the structured and unstructured approaches to auditing [see Mullarkey (1984) and Sullivan (1984) ]. Touche Ross favored a structured approach and is ranked as a structured firm. Coopers & Lybrand favored an unstructured approach and is ranked as an unstructured firm. Following the Metcalf Report (1976) size is measured on a three-point ordinal scale grouping Big 8 firms, the 'next seven', and smaller firms not in the largest fifteen. Other measures obtained are (I) the number of auditors who were partners or employees of the firm in 1982,' (2) the staffing ratio (staff to partners) for 1982, (3) audit concentration (estimated ratio of audit fees to total fees) for 1982, and (4) the average stock price betas of each firm's client portfolio. The number of audit staff and partners are obtained from each of the 22 firms. The audit and total fee measures for the Big 8 are from the Public Accounting Report and average betas for the Big 8 are from Shank and Murdock (1978) . ' All firms with a mode of '1' had a weighted mean of one. while the means of those with a mode of '2' ranged from 1.8 to 2.2, and the lowest mean for firms with a mode of '3' was 2.6. 'Only three of the eleven small firms had more than fifty auditors. and six had fewer than twenty-live. Table 3 Cross classification of audit tirm size with audit firm technology. in the panel are independent, the xz value allows rejection of the hypothesis of independence of standards preferences and technology at the 0.001 level. Furthermore, the probability level of the xZ value is not sensitive to the inclusion of the mixed ('2') preference scores with either the 'I' or the '3' positions. Panels (b) and (c) of table 4 present results for standards preferences and two size classifications based on the Metcalf Report (small expected sizes for the cells prevent tabulation of a valid x2 for a 3 x 3 table). As shown, the x2 is not significant whether the 'next seven' are classified with the Big 8 or with firms not in the largest 15.
Analysis
The significance of the x2 values in table 4 is overstated by conventional tables since there are not 107 independent observations. There is only one measure of technology and size for each firm and a board member (firm) could be represented as many as six times in a row of the tables. However. the magnitude of the xz statistic for panel (a) suggests that the relation between Table 4 Cross-classification of standards preference scores with technology and size. However, five members gave qualified assents or dissents relating to the inclusion of Appendix B on statistical sampling. Three of these acre from Big 8 tirms with Intermediate structure. one unstructured Big X and one small firm. It rcccived unqualified assents from the three structured Big 8 firms and two members from tirms belonging to the same association (of dollar-unit samplers) as the two structured non-Big X firms in the prcaent study. The other eleven members supporting the entire statement included an unstructured Big R tirm, two 'next 7' firms with intermediate structure and eight small turns uith unknown technologies. which is the only controversial issue with no obvious expected relation between preference and technology. In contrast, none of the number of auditors with preference correlations are significant at even the 0.10 level. Table 6 presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients for additional variables for the Big 8 firms. Included are the sum of preference scores on the six issues, technology, number of auditors, staffing ratios, audit concentration and portfolio beta. As shown in the first row of table 6, the positive correlation of the total vote score with technology is the only association significant at the 0.05 level although the staffing ratio and audit concentration are significant at the 0.10 level.
The only significant associations at the 0.10 level among variables other than the vote score are between audit concentration and portfolio beta and between technology and the staffing ratio. The latter correlation reflects the structured firms' apparent tendency to have fewer audit staff per partner than the unstructured firms. This is consistent with structured technology allowing a reduction in staff time relative to partners. It is inconsistent with the hypothesis that use of structured technology allows a wider span of control of subordinates.
The audit concentration with portfolio beta correlation is influenced by the fact that Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Price Waterhouse have Table 6 Spearman rank correlations between sum of standards preference scores, technology and audit firm characteristics" (Big 8 firms only). the two highest revenue concentrations in auditing and the two lowest portfolio betas. It is as if the low-beta firms choose auditors who concentrate in auditing as opposed to tax and consulting.
However, these two firms are among the most different among the Big 8 in staffing ratios and, of course, technology.
Deloitte Haskins & Sells seems to be an outlier in that it has an unusually low portfolio beta and high audit concentration for its technology (and voting behavior). The deletion of Deloitte Haskins & Sells raises the votes with audit concentration correlation to -0.973 (p = 0.001) and the votes with portfolio beta to 0.721 (p = 0.068). Also the correlation of technology with audit concentration goes to -0.771 ( p = 0.043) and technology with portfolio beta to 0.709 (p = 0.074). It is interesting to note that the two potential merger candidates (Price Waterhouse and Deloitte Haskins & Sells) are alike in their concentration in auditing and clients with low betas but different in technology, staff/ratio and voting behavior. With respect to the latter, the two firms did not express the same preference on any of the six controversial issues.
Conclusions
A pattern seems to exist for votes or preferences expressed on controversial auditing standards issues considered by the ASB. The pattern is related to technological preference for structured vs. unstructured auditing. Firms that use a structured approach tend to support audit procedure and audit reporting proposals that add structured guidance. Firms that follow an unstructured approach generally oppose codification of such guidance. Furthermore, while there is some association between size and technology, there is no significant association between size and standards preferences. These results have several implications for those concerned with audit standard setting and research in auditing. First, they suggest the concern expressed in the Metcalf Report about large firm or Big 8 dominance of the audit standard setting process is misplaced. Several large firms and several smaller firms supported each position on the controversial issues. Second, the results suggest that the composition of the standards setting board influences the nature of auditing standards.
A board comprised of members from structured firms will likely pass more structured SASS than would a board comprised of members from firms using an unstructured technology and vice versa.
Finally, researchers studying auditors' behavior with respect to procedures or reporting, or studying the organization of the profession ought to consider the potential effects of firms' technological preferences. For example, if an audit judgment experiment includes auditors from a structured and an unstructured firm, the estimate of the firm effect would include any basic technology effects. A sample from say, two structured firms would not. Similarly, a sample from a structured Big 8 and a structured small firm will likely underestimate the etfects of size differences over the population of audit firms.
